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Abstract: In this paper, I argue that the method of cases (namely, the method of using intuitive 
judgments elicited by intuition pumps as evidence for and/or against philosophical theories) is 
not a reliable method of generating evidence for and/or against philosophical theories. In other 
words, the method of cases is unlikely to generate accurate judgments more often than not. This 
is so because, if perception and intuition are analogous in epistemically relevant respects, then 
using intuition pumps to elicit intuitive judgments is like using illusions to elicit perceptual 
judgments. In both cases, judgments are made under bad epistemic circumstances. 
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1. Introduction 
A cursory look at the literature of almost any field in philosophy shows that intuitions play a 
major role in philosophical theorizing.
1
 Philosophers often use intuitive judgments elicited by 
intuition pumps as evidence for and/or against philosophical theories. Here is how some 
philosophers describe the evidential role that intuitions play in philosophical arguments: 
 
A popular strategy in philosophy is a certain sort of thought experiment I call intuition 
pump (Dennett 1984, p. 12, original emphasis; see also Dennett 1995; cf. Dorbolo 2006). 
 
The rules of the game in this sort of analytic project are relatively clear: any proposed 
analysis is tested against particular cases, usually imaginary, for which we have strong 
intuitions. The accuracy with which the judgments of the analysis match the deliverances 
of intuition then constitutes a measure of the adequacy of the analysis (Maudlin 2007, pp. 
146-147). 
 
                                                          
1
 By “intuition” I mean “intellectual seeming.” According to Brogaard (forthcoming), intellectual seemings (‘it 
intellectually seems that p’) are “seemings that result from implicit or explicit armchair reasoning, where armchair 
reasoning is reasoning that involves both a priori principles and past experience.” Chudnoff (2011b, p. 626) divides 
views on the nature of intuitions into two broad categories. According to doxastic views, intuitions are doxastic 
attitudes or dispositions. See, e.g., Williamson (2004), Williamson (2007), and Sosa (2009). According to 
perceptualist views, intuitions are “pre-doxastic experiences that […] represent abstract matters as being a certain 
way” (Chudnoff 2011b, p. 626). See, e.g., Huemer (2007) and Pryor (2005). According to Chudnoff (2011b, p. 626), 
“Perceptualist views differ from doxastic views in that according to them intuitions are not identical to doxastic 
attitudes or doxastic dispositions, but lead to doxastic attitudes and doxastic dispositions when taken at face value” 
(emphasis added). In other words, on perceptualist views, intuitions are prima facie evidence for beliefs (see 
Chudnoff 2011a and Huemer 2007). In this paper, I am concerned with the epistemology—not the nature—of 
intuitions. In particular, I am concerned with the method of cases as a way of generating evidence for and/or against 
philosophical theories. 
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It is safe to say that these intuitions—and conclusions based on them—determine the 
structure of contemporary debates in epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophy of logic, 
language, and mind. Clearly, it is our standard justificatory procedure to use intuitions as 
evidence (or as reasons) (Bealer 2000, pp. 2-3). 
 
One thing that distinguishes philosophical methodology from the methodology of the 
sciences is its extensive and avowed reliance on intuition. Especially when philosophers 
are engaged in philosophical “analysis”, they often get preoccupied with intuitions. […] 
The evidential weight accorded to intuition is often very high, in both philosophical 
practice and philosophical reflection (Goldman 2007, p. 1). 
 
Contemporary analytic philosophy is based upon intuitions. Intuitions serve as the 
primary evidence in the analysis of knowledge, justified belief, right and wrong action, 
explanation, rational action, intentionality, consciousness and a host of other properties of 
philosophical interest. Theories or analyses of the properties in question are attacked and 
defended largely on the basis of their ability to capture intuitive judgements (Pust 2001, p. 
227). 
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Appeals to intuition play a foundational role in a good deal of philosophical theory 
construction (Kornblith 2007, p. 28).
2
 
 
Here are two examples of intuitive judgments elicited by intuition pumps that are then used as 
premises in philosophical arguments. 
Example 1: Jackson’s (1982, p. 130) Mary 
 
Mary is a brilliant scientist who is, for whatever reason, forced to investigate the 
world from a black and white room via a black and white television monitor. She 
specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires, let us suppose, all the 
physical information there is to obtain about what goes on when we see ripe 
tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and so on. She discovers, for 
example, just which wavelength combinations from the sky stimulate the retina, 
and exactly how this produces via the central nervous system the contraction of 
the vocal chords and expulsion of air from the lungs that results in the uttering of 
the sentence ‘The sky is blue’.… What will happen when Mary is released from 
her black and white room or is given a color television monitor? Will she learn 
anything or not? It seems just obvious that she will learn something about the 
world and our visual experience of it. But then is it inescapable that her previous 
knowledge was incomplete. But she had all the physical information. Ergo there 
is more to have than that, and Physicalism is false. 
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 It should be noted that, contrary to the philosophers quoted here, Cappelen (2012) argues that intuitions do not play 
an evidential role in philosophical arguments. 
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Based on this hypothetical case, Jackson reasons roughly as follows: 
 
(J1) Upon considering the hypothetical case of Mary the neuroscientist, it 
intellectually seems (or intuitively appears) to me (i.e., Jackson) that Mary 
learns something new upon her release. 
(J2)  Therefore, Mary learns something new upon her release. 
(J3)  If Mary learns something new upon her release, then physicalism is false. 
(J4) Therefore, physicalism is false. 
 
Example 2: Thomson’s (1971, pp. 48-49) Violinist 
 
You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an 
unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have 
a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the 
available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to 
help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory 
system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract 
poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells 
you, “Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you—we would 
never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist is 
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now plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s 
only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can 
safely be unplugged from you.” Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this 
situation? No doubt it would be very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But 
do you have to accede to it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or 
longer still? What if the director of the hospital says, “Tough luck. I agree. But 
now you’ve got to stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of 
your life. Because remember this. All persons have a right to life, and violinists 
are persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your body, 
but a person’s right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to 
your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him.” I imagine you would 
regard this as outrageous. 
 
 
 
Based on this hypothetical case, Thomson reasons roughly as follows: 
 
(T1) Upon considering the hypothetical case of the violinist, it intellectually 
seems (or intuitively appears) to me (i.e., Thomson) that I have no moral 
obligation to remain attached to the violinist. 
(T2) Therefore, I have no moral obligation to remain attached to the violinist. 
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(T3) If I have no moral obligation to remain attached to the violinist, then, by 
analogy, a pregnant woman has no moral obligation to carry a fetus, which 
is the result of an unplanned pregnancy, for nine months. 
(T4) Therefore, a pregnant woman has no moral obligation to carry a fetus, 
which is the result of an unplanned pregnancy, for nine months. 
 
Clearly, intuitive judgments elicited by intuition pumps play a major role in these arguments. 
Whether the source of ‘Mary learns something new upon her release’ and ‘I have no moral 
obligation to remain attached to the violinist’ is properly characterized as intuition or not is 
beside the point. For present purposes, the important point is that, in both arguments, the moves 
from (J1) to (J2) and from (T1) to (T2) are based (whether explicitly or implicitly) on the 
following inference: 
 
(S1) In response to hypothetical case C, it intellectually seems (or intuitively appears) 
to S that p. 
(S2) Therefore, p. 
 
Bach (1984, p. 38) calls this kind of reasoning “default reasoning.” According to Bach (1984, p. 
43), default reasoning is based on what he calls the “take-for-granted rule”: 
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(TFG) If it seems to me that p, then infer that p, provided no reason to the contrary 
occurs to me. 
 
For example, to Jackson (1982, p. 130), “It seems just obvious that [Mary] will learn something 
about the world” (emphasis added), so he uses (whether explicitly or implicitly) this intellectual 
seeming or intuitive appearance as evidence for the claim that Mary will learn something about 
the world, and that is how he gets premise (J2) in his argument against physicalism. Note that the 
claims ‘It intellectually seems to me that Mary learns something new’ and ‘It intuitively appears 
to me that Mary learns something new’ are different from the claim ‘Mary learns something 
new’. The first two are reports about how things in the Mary case seem or appear to one, 
whereas the third is a fact about the Mary case itself. Also note that Jackson says nothing else in 
support of ‘Mary will learn something about the world’ other than that “it seems just obvious.” 
Likewise, to Thomson (1971, p. 49) it seems “outrageous” to say that one has a moral 
obligation to remain attached to the violinist, so she uses (whether explicitly or implicitly) this 
intellectual seeming or intuitive appearance as evidence for the claim that one is not morally 
obliged to remain attached to the violinist, and that is how she gets premise (T2) in her argument 
against anti-abortion views. Again, note that the claims ‘It intellectually seems to me that I am 
not morally obliged to remain attached to the violinist’ and ‘It intuitively appears to me that I am 
not morally obliged to remain attached to the violinist’ are different from the claim ‘I am not 
morally obliged to remain attached to the violinist’. The first two are reports about how things in 
the Violinist case seem or appear to one, whereas the third is a fact about the Violinist case itself. 
Also note that Thomson says nothing else in support of ‘I have no moral obligation to remain 
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attached to the violinist’ other than “I imagine you would regard [‘I am morally obliged to 
remain attached to the violinist’] as outrageous.” 
The method of cases, then, consists of two steps: 
 
 The Method of Cases (MoC) 
Step 1: Intuition Pump. In this step, S considers a hypothetical case C that is supposed 
to elicit an intuition (i.e., an intellectual seeming or intuitive appearance) I. 
Step 2: Appeal to Intuition. In this step, S uses the content of I (whose justifier is that it 
intellectually seems/intuitively appears to S that I is the case in C) as a premise in an 
argument for or against a philosophical theory T.
3
 
 
For example, upon considering the Mary case, it intellectually seems (or intuitively appears) to 
Jackson that Mary learns something new upon her release. Jackson then uses (whether explicitly 
or implicitly) the content of this intuition (i.e., that Mary learns something new upon her release) 
as a premise in his argument against physicalism. Likewise, upon considering the violinist case, 
it intellectually seems (or intuitively appears) to Thomson that she is not morally obligated to 
remain attached to the violinist. Thomson then uses (whether explicitly or implicitly) the content 
of this intuition (i.e., that she is not morally obligated to remain attached to the violinist) as a 
premise in her argument against anti-abortion views. 
                                                          
3
 On why appeals to intuition are weak arguments, see Mizrahi (2012) and Mizrahi (2013). 
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In this paper, I argue that the MoC is not a reliable method of generating evidence for 
and/or against philosophical theories. In other words, the MoC is unlikely to generate accurate 
judgments more often than not. This is so because, if perception and intuition are analogous in 
epistemically relevant respects, then using intuition pumps to elicit intuitive judgments is like 
using illusions to elicit perceptual judgments. Many philosophers, especially those who defend 
the evidential role of intuitions, endorse the perception-intuition analogy (see, e.g., Bonjour 1998 
and Bealer 1998). In what follows, I argue that from the perception-intuition analogy it follows 
that the MoC is not a reliable method of fixing philosophical belief.
4
 This is an interesting result, 
I think, because of the ubiquity of the MoC in philosophy and the fact that the perception-
intuition analogy is usually invoked to support the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophical 
arguments, not argue against such a use (see, e.g., Hales 2012). 
2. The perception-intuition analogy 
As noted above, several philosophers have argued that intellectual intuition and sense perception 
are analogous in epistemically relevant respects. For example, according to Sosa (1996, p. 154): 
 
Seemings, then, whether sensory or intellectual, might be viewed as inclinations to 
believe on the basis of direct experience (sensory) or understanding (intellectual) and 
regardless of any collateral reasoning, memory, or introspection where the objects of 
intellectual seeming also present themselves as necessary (original emphasis). 
                                                          
4
 In this paper, I am not concerned with the experimentalist challenge to the method of cases. See, e.g., Swain et al 
(2008), Ludwig (2010), Nagel (2012), and Stich (2012). See also Kuntz and Kuntz (2011). Cf. Buckwalter (2012). 
Although the experimentalist critique of the use of intuitions as evidence is clearly within the scope of issues 
concerning the epistemology of intuition, I would like to take a different approach in this paper. The approach is to 
take the perception-intuition analogy seriously, as those who defend the use of intuitions as evidence do, and then 
see what follows from that. 
11 
 
 
Arguably, the most prominent, recent proponent of the perception-intuition analogy is Chudnoff 
(2011a, 2011b). Most recently, Chudnoff (2013, pp. 362-364) has argued for the following 
analogy between perceptual knowledge and intuitive knowledge: 
 
Perceptual Knowledge (PK): If a perception makes a belief that p based on it amount to 
knowledge, it does so in virtue of (1) being an experience in which it perceptually 
appears to you that p, and (2) being an experience in which you are sensorily aware of an 
item o, such that (3) o makes p true. 
 
Intuitive Knowledge (IK): If an intuition makes a belief that p based on it amount to 
knowledge, it does so in virtue of (1) being an experience in which it intuitively appears 
to you that p, and (2) being an experience in which you are intellectually aware of an item 
o, such that (3) o makes p true. 
 
Then Chudnoff (2013, p. 364) adds: 
 
The structural parallels between (IK) and (PK) should be obvious. The differences are 
that intuitive appearance replaces perceptual appearance and intellectual awareness 
replaces sensory awareness. 
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If Chudnoff is right, then in much the same way that S is justified in believing that p, where p is 
the content of a sensory appearance in virtue of which S is sensorily aware of an object O that 
makes p true, S is justified in believing that p, where p is the content of an intellectual 
appearance in virtue of which S is intellectually aware of an object O that makes p true. Unlike 
the concrete objects of perception, however, the objects of intuition are abstract, according to 
Chudnoff (2013). 
Like Chudnoff, Hales (2012) also invokes the perception-intuition analogy in order to 
defend the epistemic role of rational intuition. According to Hales (2012, p. 180): 
 
there is a faculty of rational intuition that delivers prima facie justified beliefs about 
philosophical propositions. […] If anything is a faculty, then sense perception is. If 
intuition is sufficiently similar to perception, then it too counts as a faculty. Moreover, if 
perception produces prima facie justified beliefs about its target subject matter and 
thereby serves as a source of knowledge, then so does intuition. 
 
If Hales is right, then we should treat rational intuition as a source of prima facie justified beliefs 
in much the same way that we treat perception as a source of prima facie justified beliefs. 
In what follows, I grant for the sake of argument that the analogy between sense 
perception and intellectual intuition holds. The question I am concerned with is the following: Is 
‘it intuitively appears to S that p’ (or ‘it intellectually seems to S that p’) a reliable justifier for p? 
13 
 
If intuition is indeed analogous to perception in epistemically relevant respects, then the answer 
will partially depend on the circumstances in which it intuitively appears to S that p. In the case 
of perception, if it sensorily appears to S that p under bad epistemic circumstances, such as those 
of paradox illusions, such as the Penrose Tribar (see Figure 1) and the Penrose Stairs (see Figure 
2), and optical illusions, such as the Müller-Lyer illusion (see Figure 3) and the Ponzo illusion 
(see Figure 4), then the sensory appearance that p is not a reliable justifier for p. 
 
Figure 1. It appears that the tribar is made of three straight beams of square cross-section that 
meet pairwise at right angles at the vertices of the triangle they form, which is impossible in 
three-dimensional space. (Image from Wikimedia Commons: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Penrose_triangle). 
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Figure 2. It appears that the stairs make four ninety-degree turns as they ascend or descent and 
yet they form a continuous loop, such that a person could climb them endlessly, which is 
impossible in three-dimensional space. (Image from Wikimedia Commons: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Penrose_triangle). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. It appears that the line on the right is longer than the line on the left. (Image from 
Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/File:Müller-Lyer_illusion). 
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Figure 4. It appears that the top horizontal line is longer than the bottom horizontal line. (Image 
from Wikimedia Commons: https://commons.wikimedia.org/File:Ponzo_illusion). 
 
 
 
Similarly, in the case of intellectual intuition, if it intuitively appears or intellectually seems to S  
that p under bad epistemic circumstances, such as those of intuition pumps, then the intuitive 
appearance or intellectual seeming that p is unreliable as a justifier for p. In the next section, then, 
I argue that intuition pumps are bad epistemic circumstances in much the same way that illusions 
are. 
3. Bad epistemic circumstances 
If we take the analogy between sense perception and intuition seriously, as those who invoke it 
in defense of the evidential role of intuitions do, then it follows that the epistemic status of the 
content of intuitions (as when it intellectually seems to S that p) and the content of sense 
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perceptions (as when it sensorily seems to S that p) is analogous as well. In that case, it is 
important to ask whether the circumstances in which intuitive and perceptual judgments are 
made are epistemically good circumstances. As epistemic circumstances under which judgments 
are made, intuition pumps are bad epistemic circumstances in much the same way that illusions 
are, or so I argue. I use the term ‘illusion’ to refer to images such the Penrose Tribar (see Figure 
1) and the Penrose Stairs (see Figure 2), which are known as “paradox illusions,” as well as 
images such as the Müller-Lyer illusion (see Figure 3) and the Ponzo illusion (see Figure 4), 
which are known as “optical illusions.” The first premise of my overall argument, then, is the 
following: 
 
(1) Making intuitive judgments under bad epistemic circumstances is as unreliable as making 
perceptual judgments under bad epistemic circumstances. 
 
This follows straightforwardly from the perception-intuition analogy. As further support for (1), 
however, consider the following. According to one plausible explanation for illusions, like the 
Penrose Tribar (see Figure 1) and the Penrose Stairs (see Figure 2), such “paradox illusions” 
arise because what we see clashes with our implicit assumptions about how the world works. For 
instance, in the case of the Penrose Tribar, we assume that adjacent edges must join, and so it 
appears that the tribar is made of three straight beams of square cross-section that meet pairwise 
at right angles at the vertices of the triangle they form, even though that is impossible in three-
dimensional space. Similarly, in the case of the Penrose Stairs, we assume that the stairs must 
join, and so it appears that the stairs make four ninety-degree turns as they ascend or descent and 
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yet they form a continuous loop, such that a person could climb them endlessly, even though that 
is impossible in three-dimensional space. 
It is important to note that these implicit assumptions do not have to be conscious or in 
our immediate awareness. Hermann von Helmholtz was probably the first to talk about 
“unconscious inferences” vis-à-vis illusions (Schett 1999).5 Since then, however, the idea has 
gained much support from studies in perceptual psychology. Several studies suggest that, in 
forming a coherent picture of the external world, we do make inferences, albeit “unconscious 
inferences,” from sensory input. For example, the rubber hand illusion shows how we “adopt” 
the rubber hand as our own based on a combination of visual input, i.e., seeing the rubber hand, 
and tactile input, i.e., having one of our hands stroked with a paintbrush (Botvinick and Cohen 
1998; Ehrsson, Holmes, and Passingham 2005). The rubber hand illusion is a form of body 
transfer illusion (Slater et al 2010). 
Similarly, in intuition pumps, a rather similar form of “illusion” arises, I submit, because 
what we intellectually “see” clashes with our implicit assumptions about the hypothetical case in 
question. For example, in the Mary case, some, like Jackson, “see” with their mind’s eye that 
Mary learns something new upon her release given that she is supposed to have “complete 
physical information of color perception.” But what does it even mean to have “complete 
physical information”? Do we really understand this notion any better than the concept of “non-
physical information”? One’s judgment about the Mary case, then, will depend on how one 
understands these notions, namely, “complete physical information” and “non-physical 
information.” That is partly why not everyone shares Jackson’s intuition that Mary learns 
                                                          
5
 According to Brogaard (forthcoming), intellectual seemings (‘it intellectually seems that p’) are “seemings that 
result from implicit or explicit armchair reasoning, where armchair reasoning is reasoning that involves both a priori 
principles and past experience” (emphasis added). 
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something new upon her release (see, e.g., Dennett 1991). So, depending on how one 
understands the notions of “complete physical information” and “non-physical information,” one 
will intuit that Mary learns something new or that she does not in order to make sense of the 
Mary case. 
Likewise, in the violinist case, some, like Thomson, “see” with their mind’s eye that one 
is not morally obligated to remain attached to the violinist for nine months given that most 
people cannot afford to be in this situation for nine months. But what if one can afford to be in 
this situation for nine months? So, depending on one’s assumptions about one’s own personal 
circumstances at the time, one will intuit that one has or that one does not have a moral 
obligation to remain attached to the violinist in order to make sense of the violinist case. 
Some might think that intuitive and perceptual judgments actually differ in that respect. 
That is, even if intuitive judgments are affected by the circumstances of the intuiter (i.e., the 
intuiter’s assumptions, beliefs, abilities, etc.), perceptual judgments are not affected by the 
circumstances of the perceiver (i.e., the perceiver’s assumptions, beliefs, abilities, etc.). Several 
studies, however, suggest that this is not the case. In other words, perceptual judgments in 
response to geometrical illusions, such as the Müller-Lyer illusion (see Figure 3), do seem to 
vary across cultures. To cite one classical study as an example, Segall et al (1963) present data 
from fifteen societies 
 
showing substantial intersocial differences of two types in susceptibility to geometric 
optical illusions. The pattern of response differences suggests the existence of different 
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habits of perceptual inference which relate to cultural and ecological factors in the visual 
environment (emphasis added).
6
 
 
As Rookes and Wilson (2000, p. 95) put it, “These findings lend powerful support to the idea 
that our physical environment can affect our perceptual experience.” If sense perception and 
intuition are indeed analogous, then our intuitions, too, are probably affected by our 
environment.
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Since the work of Stein and Meredith (1993), the notion of multisensory integration has 
gained much credence. According to Lewkowicz and Ghazanfar (2009): 
 
The objects and events that make up our everyday experience provide us with a constant 
flow of sensory signals in multiple modalities. Although such inputs can potentially 
create confusion, our ability to integrate multisensory information enables us to have 
coherent and meaningful perceptual experiences. 
 
We are fooled by illusions partly because our senses work in conjunction, rather than in isolation, 
and so sensory input from one sensory modality can interfere and/or override sensory input from 
another sensory modality. Likewise, since intuition pumps are confusing in much the same way 
                                                          
6
 See also Coren and Girgus (1978). 
7
 In that respect, perceptions probably vary across cultures in much the same way that intuitions do. On the cultural 
variation of intuitions, see Machery et al 2012. 
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that illusions are, insofar as we can be pulled in opposite directions upon considering them (e.g., 
Mary learns something new or she does not) depending on how the hypothetical cases are 
presented to us and the implicit assumptions we make about them, it is reasonable to expect that 
we can be similarly fooled by intuition pumps. 
Accordingly, the second premise of my overall argument is the following: 
 
(2) Intuition pumps are bad epistemic circumstances in much the same way that illusions are 
bad epistemic circumstances. 
 
From (1) and (2) it follows that 
 
(3) Making intuitive judgments in response to intuition pumps is as unreliable as making 
perceptual judgments in response to illusions. 
 
If this argument is sound, then just as making perceptual judgments under bad epistemic 
circumstances, such as the circumstances of a perceiver who is faced with an illusion (e.g., the 
Penrose Tribar), is a recipe for getting things wrong about the image in question more often than 
not, making intuitive judgments under bad epistemic circumstances, such as the circumstances of 
an intuiter who is faced with an intuition pump (e.g., the Mary case), is a recipe for getting things 
wrong about the case in question more often than not. 
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4. Objections and replies 
To sum up, my overall argument runs as follows: 
(1) Making intuitive judgments under bad epistemic circumstances is as unreliable as making 
perceptual judgments under bad epistemic circumstances. 
(2) Intuition pumps are bad epistemic circumstances in much the same way that illusions are 
bad epistemic circumstances. 
(3) Therefore, making intuitive judgments in response to intuition pumps is as unreliable as 
making perceptual judgments in response to illusions. 
In Section 3, I provided support for the two premises of this overall argument. In this section, I 
anticipate and reply to five objections against this argument. 
First objection: One might object to my argument by claiming that there is an 
epistemically relevant difference between intuitive judgments elicited by intuition pumps and 
perceptual judgments elicited by illusions. More specifically, we can revise our judgments vis-à-
vis an illusion once we are told it is an illusion. But we cannot easily revise our judgments vis-à-
vis an intuition pump once we are told it is an intuition pump. In other words, intellectual 
seemings are more persistent than sensory seemings. 
In reply to the first objection, I would like to make two points. First, note that even when 
we are told that the Penrose Tribar, say, is an illusion it still seems to us that the tribar is made of 
three straight beams of square cross-section that meet pairwise at right angles at the vertices of 
the triangle they form. Once we are told that the Penrose Tribar is an illusion, we might be 
inclined to revise our judgment that tribar is made of three straight beams of square cross-section 
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that meet pairwise at right angles at the vertices of the triangle they form. But the content of our 
sensory seeming is unlikely to change; it is still <the tribar is made of three straight beams of 
square cross-section that meet pairwise at right angles at the vertices of the triangle they form >, 
since it still seems to us that the tribar is made of three straight beams of square cross-section that 
meet pairwise at right angles at the vertices of the triangle they form. As it turns out, the content 
of this sensory seeming is false. Similarly, when we consider the Mary case, it might seem to us 
that Mary learns something new. Once we are told that the story about Mary is an intuition pump 
designed to refute physicalism, we might be inclined to revise our judgment that Mary learns 
something new. But the content of our intellectual seeming is unlikely to change; it is still <Mary 
learns something new> (or <Mary does not learn something new>), since it still seems to us that 
Mary learns something new (or that she does not). 
Second, perceptual judgments elicited by illusions are more persistent than one might 
think. Consider, for example, the McGurk Effect, which shows that what we see sometimes 
overrides what we hear (McGurk and MacDonald 1976). Even when one finds out that the 
McGurk Effect is an illusion, the effect still works. In fact, it works on researchers who have 
studied it for years. So I think there are no good reasons to believe that intellectual seemings are 
more persistent than sensory seemings. And, even if they were, it would still not follow that they 
are epistemically more reliable than sensory seemings. 
Second objection: One might also object to my overall argument by claiming that 
intuition pumps can be distinguished based on their quality (Rescher 2005). If so, then, using 
some factor to assess the quality of intuition pumps, one could argue that there are epistemically 
bad intuition pumps, and so we should not put much rational confidence in our intuitions about 
these intuition pumps, but there are also epistemically good intuition pumps. One such factor, for 
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instance, might be the specificity of the hypothetical case. That is to say, the more detailed the 
hypothetical case in the relevant respects, the better the intuition pump (Brendel 2004). 
In reply to the second objection, I would like to make the following points. Recall that 
what makes illusions epistemically bad circumstances is that what we see clashes with some of 
our implicit assumptions about the image in question. To make sense of these illusions, then, we 
“fill in the details,” as it were, in a way that makes sense to us. Similarly, what makes intuition 
pumps epistemically bad circumstances is that what we “see” with the mind’s eye clashes with 
some of our implicit assumptions about the hypothetical case in question. To make sense of these 
hypothetical cases, then, we “fill in the details,” in a way that makes sense to us. The problem is 
that each person will probably fill in the details in a way that makes sense to him or her and there 
is no principled way to control for that kind of details-filling when constructing an intuition 
pump.
8
 
For example, in the Mary case, some understand the notion of “complete physical 
information” in such a way that it entails knowing everything about color perception, and hence 
they intuit that Mary does not learn something new upon her release (e.g., Dennett 1991), 
whereas others understand the notion of “complete physical information” in such a way that it 
does not entail knowing everything about color perception, and hence they intuit that Mary does 
learn something new upon her release (e.g., Jackson 1982). Likewise, in the violinist case, some 
might implicitly assume that they cannot afford to remain attached to the violinist for nine 
months, and hence they intuit that they are not obligated to, whereas others might implicitly 
assume that they can afford to remain attached to the violinist for nine months, and hence they 
                                                          
8
 Recall that both perceptions and intuitions probably vary across cultures. See footnotes 6 and 7 above. 
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intuit that they are obligated to. Still others might not have any implicit assumptions about 
affordability at all. 
Third objection. Some might insist that intuitions can still serve as prima facie, i.e., 
defeasible, evidence for premises in philosophical arguments, even in bad epistemic 
circumstances, such as in intuition pumps, because intellectual intuition affords one with some 
sort of direct access to the facts about hypothetical cases. In other words, an intellectual seeming 
(or intuitive appearance) that p can still be a prima facie (i.e., defeasible) justification for p. 
In reply to the third objection, I would like to make the following points. I think that there 
are several serious problems with the view of the evidential role of intuition according to which 
intuition gives S direct epistemic access to the facts about hypothetical case C. Briefly, here are 
some of the most serious problems: 
 If we take the analogy between intellectual intuition and sense perception seriously, then 
the direct-access view flies in the face of findings from perceptual psychology. As I have 
mentioned above, studies on illusions show that sense perception is expectation-laden 
(see, e.g., Deliza et al 2003). Such studies suggest that sense perception does not simply 
give us direct access (unmediated by inference, whether conscious or otherwise) to the 
facts. So, if sense perception and intellectual intuition are indeed analogous in 
epistemically relevant respects, then it is unlikely that intuition gives us direct access to 
the facts, either. 
 If intuition gives S direct access to the facts, how do we explain philosophical 
disagreement? Jackson intuits that Mary learns something new, but Dennett (1991) and 
others intuit that she does not. Do we want to say that Jackson has some special access to 
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the facts that others do not? Indeed, how do we know that it is Jackson that has a special 
access to the facts about the Mary case, and not Dennett? 
 If intuition gives S direct access to the facts, how do we explain findings in experimental 
philosophy, which show that intuitions vary across cultures and are subject to order and 
framing effects? (See, e.g., Machery et al 2012.) If people simply intuit what is the case, 
why would cultural background make a difference? (Stich 1988) 
Given these serious problems with the direct-access view of intuition, I submit, there are no good 
reasons to think that intellectual intuition gives us direct access to facts about hypothetical cases. 
Indeed, those who endorse the perception-intuition analogy, and who also wish to take empirical 
evidence seriously, should accept that intuition does not give us direct epistemic access to facts, 
given that perception probably doesn’t. 
Fourth objection. My argument, if sound, implies skepticism about perceptual judgments. 
But skepticism about perceptual judgments is unwarranted. Therefore, my argument must be 
unsound. 
In reply to the fourth objection, I would like to make the following points. My argument 
does not imply skepticism about perceptual judgments. Rather, my argument implies skepticism 
about perceptual judgments that are made under bad epistemic circumstances, such as illusions. 
In the same way that we would not trust our perceptual judgments about the Müller-Lyer illusion 
or the Ponzo illusion, since illusions are bad epistemic circumstances, we should not trust 
intuitive judgments that are made under bad epistemic circumstances, such as the circumstances 
of intuition pumps. On the other hand, making perceptual judgments under good epistemic 
circumstances may still be a reliable way of fixing belief. Even making intuitive judgments 
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under good epistemic circumstances might be a reliable way of fixing belief. But intuition pumps 
are not good epistemic circumstances, or so I argue. 
Fifth objection. If my argument is sound, then it is self-defeating, for I have argued that 
the MoC is unreliable by using illusions as an intuition pump. 
In reply to the firth, and final, objection, I would like to make the following points. At its 
core, my argument is not an appeal to intuition, as in Step 2 of the MoC. Rather, at its core, my 
argument is an argument by analogy. The analogy, as stated in Section 2, is the one between 
sense perception and intellectual intuition. If one accepts the perception-intuition analogy, as 
many do, then one must also accept that making judgments (whether perceptual or intuitive) 
under bad epistemic circumstances (such as illusions and intuition pumps) is not a reliable 
method of fixing belief. I take that to follow straightforwardly from the perception-intuition 
analogy. The question, then, is whether intuition pumps are bad epistemic circumstances. I argue 
that intuition pumps are bad epistemic circumstances because what we intuit in response to 
intuition pumps is not the facts about the hypothetical case in question but rather the details we 
fill in to make sense of that hypothetical case. The problem is that people fill in the details in 
different ways and there is no principled way to control for this kind of details-filling when 
constructing intuition pumps. 
This is an interesting result, I submit, for the following reasons. First, the perception-
intuition analogy is usually invoked to support the use of intuitions as evidence in philosophical 
arguments, not argue against such a use (see, e.g., Hales 2012). Second, as the quotations in 
Section 1 illustrate, the MoC is a widely used method of philosophical argumentation. If it is 
indeed an unreliable method, as I have argued, then philosophers should stop using it. 
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5. Conclusion 
In this paper, I have argued that the method of cases (namely, the method of using intuitive 
judgments elicited by intuition pumps as evidence for and/or against philosophical theories) is 
not a reliable method of generating evidence for and/or against philosophical theories. In other 
words, the method of cases is not a reliable method of fixing philosophical belief. This is so 
because, if perception and intuition are analogous in epistemically relevant respects, then using 
intuition pumps to elicit intuitive judgments is like using illusions to elicit perceptual judgments. 
In both cases, judgments are made under bad epistemic circumstances. 
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